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COMMENT
HEARTS ON THEIR SLEEVES: SYMBOLIC
DISPLAYS OF EMOTION BY SPECTATORS
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
MEGHAN E. LIND*
This Comment addresses whether public displays of emotion in the
form of expressive or symbolic clothing negatively impact a criminal
defendant's right to a fair trial. It weighs the potentially prejudicial
influence of allowing expressive clothing in the courtroom against the
importance of free speech and victims' rights. This Comment also
considers the powerful impact of extrinsic evidence on the psychology of
juries. Ultimately, this Comment recommends that all expressive clothing
be banned from criminal courtrooms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of justice within the American legal system hinges on
impartiality, fairness, and evenhandedness.' These idealistic concepts are
especially imperative in the sphere of criminal law, where the life of the
criminally accused may be literally or fundamentally at stake.2 The
Supreme Court captured the deep-seated necessity for fairness in criminal
trials in Gideon v. Whinwright: "From the very beginning, our state and
national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.",3 As the
Supreme Court explains, the crucial notion of fairness in the courtroom is
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Boston College, 2003.
See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.").
2 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) ("[W]here one's life is at stake-and
accounting for the frailties of human nature-we can only say that in light of the
circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet constitutional standards.").
' 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
1147
MEGHAN E. LIND
grounded in formal laws.4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees criminally-accused defendants the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury.5 Additionally, the Federal Rules of
Evidence aim to ensure fairness and justice in courtroom proceedings.6
Despite its optimistic laws and goals, the American criminal justice
system is inevitably imperfect because it depends on humans-who are
inherently flawed. As a result, it is not implausible for a guilty criminal to
be acquitted, nor is it unimaginable for an innocent defendant to be
mistakenly put behind bars.8 Jurors are especially susceptible to external
factors, such as compassion, sympathy, and empathy, which can greatly
influence their verdicts. 9 Indeed, these peripheral factors can influence the
decision of the jury "as much as, if not more than, the factual merits of a
case." 10  Judges and attorneys, then, have a crucial responsibility to
guarantee fair trials by protecting the jury from immaterial influences. 1
Nevertheless, outside factors can still influence a jury.' 2  Trial
spectators within the courtroom, especially those who sit in plain view of
jurors and in close proximity to the jury's box, can intentionally or
unintentionally affect the jury. 3 Justice Holmes once observed that "[a]ny
judge who has sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms, they are
extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere."' 4 In
recent years, trial spectators have threatened to "impregnate" the minds of
4Id.
5 U.S CONST. amend. VI, cl. 1.
6 FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.").
7 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 65 (1866) (Argument for the Petitioner)
("We do not assert that the jury trial is an infallible mode of ascertaining truth. Like
everything human, it has its imperfections.").
8 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1321 (1997).
9 Peter H. Huang, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 31, 41
n.12 (1992).
1o Id.
1 See FED. R. EvID. 401-15; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2007)
(prohibiting attorneys from alluding to "any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence").
12 See 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 235 (2002) (explaining how the conduct of spectators
can be grounds for a new trial).
13 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Disruptive Conduct of Spectators in Presence of Jury
During Criminal Trial as Basis for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 659
(2007).
14 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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jurors by wearing expressive clothing to court.15 Specifically, it is a
growing trend for spectators to publicly express their emotion by wearing
buttons depicting the victim, armbands, and color-coded ribbons to trial.' 6
This Comment examines how symbolic clothing affects a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights. It balances free speech and victims' rights
considerations against concerns of prejudicial influence. This Comment
concludes by proposing a comprehensive ban on expressive clothing in all
courtrooms.
After a brief background, Part Ill(A) concentrates on the compelling
justifications for an outright ban: Section One analyzes the issue from a
psychological perspective; Section Two details the inherent prejudice in
symbolic items in the courtroom; Section Three shows how a defendant's
presumption of innocence is undercut by public displays of emotion;
Section Four focuses on the Sixth Amendment; and Section Five addresses
due process issues. Part Il(B) of this Comment analyzes the arguments
that expressive clothing does not impede upon the judicial process: Section
One addresses the rights of victims; Section Two tackles unavoidable
emotion within the courtroom; Section Three discusses First Amendment
concerns; and Section Four deals with the practical issues of a ban on
expressive clothing.
II. BACKGROUND
Over the past twenty years, appellate courts across the country have
reexamined criminal convictions because spectators wore symbolic displays
of emotion during the trial.17 These cases involve a wide variety of
expressive apparel, ranging from ribbons to colored armbands to corsages
15 See generally Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated sub nom.
Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006) (spectators wore buttons depicting the victim
during the jury trial); Palumbo v. Ortiz, 89 F. App'x 3 (9th Cir. 2004) (unpublished mem.)
(victim's relatives wore badges with pictures of the victim on them); Norris v. Risley, 918
F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (spectators wore buttons that said "Women Against Rape" to rape
trial); United States v. Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (defendant's supporters
wore religious garb to his trial); People v. Houston, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818 (Ct. App. 2005)
(spectators displayed buttons and placards with image of victim on them); People v. Pennisi,
563 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (decedent's family wore black and red corsages in the
courtroom); Cooper v. Commonwealth, No. 0819-03-4, 2004 WL 1876416 (Va. Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 2004) (spectators displayed photographs of the victim in the courtroom).
16 Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 651; Palumbo, 89 F. App'x at 4; Norris, 918 F.2d at 829; Yahweh,
779 F. Supp. at 1343; Houston, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 831; Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 613;
Cooper, 2004 WL 1876416.
17 See generally Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 651; Palumbo, 89 F. App'x at 4; Norris, 918 F.2d at
829; Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. at 1343; Houston, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 831; Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d
at 613; Cooper, 2004 WL 1876416.
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to matching uniforms to t-shirts.18  Each court handled the situation
differently. Some held that expressive clothing infringes on a defendant's
right to a fair trial because it erodes the defendant's right to be presumed
innocent and creates an unacceptable risk that the courtroom showing of
support will unduly influence the jury. 19  Other courts held that any
prejudice presented by a spectator's display can be cured by appropriate
instructions from the judge to the jury.2°
The United States Supreme Court has addressed whether courtroom
conditions infringe upon a defendant's right to a fair trial in two cases:
Estelle v. Williams21 and Holbrook v. Flynn.22 In Estelle, the defendant was
compelled to wear identifiable'prison garb to his jury trial.23 The defendant
specifically asked to wear his civilian clothes during his trial, but his
request was denied.24 Ultimately, he wore prison-issued clothing and was
convicted of murder.25 The Court determined that when a defendant is
compelled to wear a prison uniform to trial, "the constant reminder of the
accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may
affect a juror's judgment. 26 The opinion explained that when a courtroom
situation is challenged as prejudicial, the court must determine whether "an
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play. 27
In Holbrook v. Flynn, the front row of the spectators' section was
filled with customary courtroom security plus four additional uniformed
state troopers.28 Defense counsel argued that the strong presence of the
uniformed state troopers influenced the jury by implying that the defendants
were of "bad character., 29 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
jury could reasonably draw a wide range of inferences from the officers;
therefore, the presence of the officers was not inherently prejudicial. 30 The
18 See People v. Aleem, 149 P.3d 765, 770 (Colo. 2007) (finding that a defendant, who
wore a series of controversial t-shirts to trial, should not have been held in contempt of
!court); Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 613; Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. at 1343; In re Woods, 114 P.3d
607, 616 (Wash. 2005) (holding that defendant's right to fair trial was not denied when
victim's family wore black and orange commemorative ribbons in the courtroom).
19 See, e.g., Norris, 918 F.2d at 834.
20 See, e.g., Houston, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 851.
21 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
22 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
23 Estelle, 425 U.S. at 502.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 502-03.
26 Id. at 504-05.
27 Id. at 505.
28 475 U.S. 560, 562 (1986).
29 Id. at 563.
3 Id. at 569.
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Court distinguished the situation from that in Estelle by arguing that unlike
forcing a defendant to wear prison garb, placing security guards in a
courtroom serves a legitimate state purpose.
31
On October 11, 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the
constitutionality of one specific type of non-verbal expression at issue in
this Comment: pictorial buttons.32 In that case, family members of a
murder victim wore buttons depicting a photograph of the victim to court.33
The family sat in the front row of the gallery, and on each day of the trial at
least three members of the family wore the buttons.34 The buttons were
several inches in diameter and, according to the defendant, "very
noticeable.,
35
On December 11, 2006, the Court issued an opinion noting that "the
effect on a defendant's fair-trial rights of the spectator conduct to which
[the defendant] objects is an open question in our jurisprudence. 36 The
Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that separate courts have handled
the issue in different ways.37 Still, the Court chose not to rule on whether
spectator buttons are unconstitutional. 38  The majority did not expressly
comment on why it sidestepped the opportunity to make a rule, but Justice
Kennedy's concurrence explained that a rule against buttons in the
courtroom "should be explored in the court system, and then established in
[the Supreme] Court., 3
9
This Comment picks up where the Supreme Court left off in Musladin
and argues that the legal conception of symbolic speech within the
courtroom should include all forms of non-verbal expression. The
Comment looks at the overall effect of all types of symbolic spectator
conduct including the aforementioned use of ribbons, armbands, and
31 Id. at 571-72 ("Unlike a policy requiring detained defendants to wear prison garb, the
deployment of troopers was intimately related to the State's general interest in maintaining
custody during the proceedings ....").
32 Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006).
33 Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated sub nom. Carey v.
Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 653.
37 Id. at 654 ("[L]ower courts have diverged widely in their treatment of defendants'
spectator-conduct claims.").
38 The primary issue in Musladin was whether the Ninth Circuit improperly held that a
lower court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
The Supreme Court was able to resolve that issue without opining as to the constitutionality
of the spectator conduct involved in the case.
39 Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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clothing, as well as other forms of expression that may be used in the
future.
III. DISCUSSION
There are five chief reasons to forbid expressive clothing and
accessories in all courtrooms. Expressive items (i) psychologically affect
juries; (ii) are inherently prejudicial; 40 (iii) undercut the presumption of
innocence;41 (iv) violate the Sixth Amendment;42 and (v) infringe upon a
defendant's right to due process.43 This Comment will address each of
these arguments and then respond to the four primary arguments that
symbolic clothing should be permitted, namely: (i) victims have a special
place in the courtroom;44 (ii) other displays of emotion are permitted;45 (iii)
the First Amendment authorizes spectators to express themselves; and (iv)
the practicality of regulating spectators' clothing makes an outright ban
unworkable.
A. COMPELLING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN OUTRIGHT BAN
1. A Psychological Perspective
Symbolic clothing and accessories are inherently prejudicial and thus
hinder the possibility of a fair trial.46 The underlying principle that supports
each of the following arguments for banning symbolic clothing is the reality
that juries are psychologically susceptible to influences within the
courtroom. 47  Sociological studies of jurors and juries confirm that they
make decisions based on emotional factors.48  For example, one applied
research psychologist argues that "jurors reach their verdict decisions with
their right brains, then endorse these decisions with their left brains (i.e.,
40 Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 28-32, Musladin v. Lamarque, 403 F.3d 1072
(9th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-16653).
41 Id. at 32.
42 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.
Ct. 649 (2006) (No. 05-785), 2006 WL 2506636.
41 Id. at 9.
44 See Brief of Amici Curiae New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center in Support of
Petitioner at 4, Carey v. Musladin, 547 U.S. 1069 (2006) (No. 05-785), 2006 WL 1746419
[hereinafter Brief for New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center].
41 Id. at 9.
46 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (finding that the state cannot force a
defendant to stand trial in prison garb because such attire could undermine the fairness of the
fact finding process by undercutting the presumption of innocence).
41 See Huang, supra note 9, at 41-42 n.12.
48 id.
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jurors utilize emotions to decide the case, then shuffle through the evidence
to authenticate their emotional reactions on an intellectual basis). ''49 Since
jurors rely on emotions in their decision-making process, it follows that
they are especially receptive to emotional factors. The juxtaposition of
courtroom displays of emotion with emotionally-influenced jurors creates a
severe risk that verdicts will be rendered on sentiments rather than facts.
In order to fully understand the extent to which emotions play a role in
a jury's verdict, it is useful to examine the psychological basis for the idea.
There are essentially three reasons that emotions, particularly sympathy,
affect jurors' abilities to reach decisions.50 First, sympathy informs jurors
that someone else is "suffering significantly and undeservedly. ',51 This can
cause people to feel that an injustice has been done because there is a
"discrepancy between what the sufferer deserves and what has happened to
him.' '52 As a result of this inconsistency, jurors often feel the desire to
relieve the suffering of another. Applied to the issue of expressive
clothing in the courtroom, spectators are purposefully and deliberately
exposing their emotional sentiments to the jury. Once the jury recognizes
that the victims are experiencing undue suffering, it will want to redistribute
justice to alleviate their pain.54
Of course, juries may feel sympathy for victims' family and friends
even in the absence of public displays of emotion. Jurors can logically
deduce that crimes negatively affect all associates of the victim. They may
not know, however, the extent to which the crime has pained the family
members and friends of the victim. Symbolic pieces of clothing and
expressive accessories communicate to the jury that the loss was enormous.
Additionally, they serve as constant reminders of the suffering endured,
implicitly appealing to the sympathies of the jury. The unspoken message
of the spectators is clear: the way to ease our pain is to convict the
defendant for doing this to us. Given the human tendency to value the
suffering of others, it is not unreasonable to believe that the jury will
subconsciously obey the spectators' wishes.55
49 Amy Singer, The Use of Singerian Litigation Psychology to Persuade Jurors During
Eminent Domain Cases, SE45 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J. 259, 275 (2000).
so Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1997).
51 Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted).
52 Id.
" Id. at 31.
54 See generally id. at 30-32.
" Id. at 30.
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Second, emotions allow jurors to view the world from the sufferer's
perspective and shape their decisions accordingly. 56 In fact, "perspective-
taking gives the legal decision-maker an enhanced appreciation of the
victim's situation that might not be available" without sympathy.57 When a
juror is able to see the case from the victim's perspective, that juror is more
likely to identify with the victim's side of the trial.58 Again, the danger of
bias resulting from public displays of emotion in the courtroom is evident.
Third and finally, experiencing emotion "motivates the decision-maker
to do something about the suffering she perceives because sympathy
indicates that the decision-maker (properly) cares about and values that
suffering. '59 This is true because "whatever one's principles of justice they
are utterly meaningless without that fundamental human sense of caring and
compassion, our ability to understand and be concerned about the well-
being of other human beings .... Under this logic, a juror's human
instinct to care for others will prompt that juror to make the decision that
will most likely alleviate suffering.61
The overarching problem with jurors experiencing sympathy prompted
by external factors is that "[t]o the extent that justice depends on impartial
fairness, sympathetic bias may yield unfair decisions. 62  Juries are
instructed to make a decision based solely on the evidence presented to
them during the trial. The Supreme Court has "declared that one accused of
a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the
basis of the evidence introduced at trial. 63 Whenever the sympathies of the
jury are inflamed to the point that the verdict is influenced by those
emotions, the jury has not based their decision solely on the evidence
introduced. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly prohibit
evidence that purposefully plays upon the sympathies of a jury from being
introduced at trial.64
56 Id. at 33.
57 Id.
58 Id.
" Id. at 36.
60 Id. at 36 (quoting Robert C. Solomon, The Emotions of Justice, 3 SOC. JUST. RES. 345,
360 (1989)).
61 Feigenson, supra note 50, at 36 ("Experiencing sympathy motivates the decision-
maker to do something about the suffering she perceives ... .
62 Id. at 49.
63 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
64 FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
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2. The Inherent Prejudice of Expressive Items
Taking psychological effects into consideration, symbolic expression
in the courtroom decreases the possibility of a fair trial.65 In Estelle, the
Supreme Court laid out a legal standard for determining whether courtroom
conditions infringe upon a defendant's right to a fair trial.66 The Court
stated that a courtroom arrangement was inherently prejudicial, and thus
infringed upon a defendant's right to a fair trial, when "an unacceptable risk
is presented of impermissible factors coming into play. 67 In Holbrook, the
Court stated that the standard for determining whether something is
inherently prejudicial does not depend on "whether jurors articulated a
consciousness of some prejudicial effect," but whether there is a risk that
external factors could influence the verdict.68
Under this standard, symbolic items are inherently prejudicial. As the
Supreme Court stated, even the threat of impermissible factors coming into
play should preclude such items.6 9 In In re Murchison, the Court made
explicit this low threshold for measuring prejudice: "[O]ur system of law
has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.,
70
The grave importance of fairness in the criminal system demands that even
potentially prejudicial factors be removed from the process. 71 Applied here,
the mere chance that symbolic displays of emotion could bring
"impermissible factors into play" should exclude the items from the
courtroom.
As explained above, the Supreme Court clearly recognizes that "one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined
solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds
of... other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial. 72 When imperfect
humans 73 sitting on a jury are given the opportunity to reach a decision
based on something other than the merits of the case, there is an inherent
danger of injustice. The emotional displays of spectators may tempt jurors
to make a decision based on sympathy, rather than on legal facts.
65 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976).
66 Id. at 505.
67 id.
68 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986).
69 Id.
70 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
71 Id.
72 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
73 See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 65 (1866) (referring to the natural flaws of
juries: "We do not assert that the jury trial is an infallible mode of ascertaining truth. Like
everything human, it has its imperfections.").
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Opponents argue that non-verbal expressions are not inherently
prejudicial because they do not portray an explicit message.74 Under this
reasoning, there is no risk of impermissible factors coming into play
because the factors are not overt. In deciding Holbrook, the Court
recognized that "prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to
separate a defendant from the community at large. 75 In other words, the
prison clothes sent a clear message to the jury that the State believed the
defendant to be dangerous, harmful, and, implicitly, guilty.76 Unlike prison
clothes, however, expressive items can be interpreted in many different
ways. The family and friends of a murder victim may simply be expressing
their grief rather than implicating any guilt onto the defendant. They may
be wearing the expressive items out of a simple desire to remember the
victim. Thus, some argue that just as the presence of state troopers could
produce a wide variety of inferences,77 so too could the presence of
expressive items relay a variety of messages to the jury.78
However, even assuming that family and friends intend the expressive
items to be mere memorials to the victim, the items are still inserting
irrelevant external factors into the case.79  The families are still
communicating non-verbally with the jury. It is true that a wide variety of
inferences may be drawn from the non-verbal communication, but that is
precisely the problem. The danger is that despite the intentions of the
spectators, the jury may interpret the symbols as signs of guilt, or emotional
pleas for a guilty verdict. The possibility that the items will inflame the
jury's desire to "rectify" the family's loss as best they can is very serious.
Additionally, the danger of unfair prejudice from expressive mementos
outweighs any legal interest the state may have in allowing such items to be
displayed. The Supreme Court in Estelle considered that "[u]nlike physical
restraints.., compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no
essential state policy." 80  Stated differently, the Court recognized that
outside factors may be permissible if they serve another state purpose. 8
74 See Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 1973) ("No prejudice can result
from seeing that which is already known.").
75 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986).
76 id.
77 Id.
78 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.
Ct. 649 (2006) (No. 05-785), 2006 WL 1746418.
79 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 562 (1965) ("The basic premise behind the Court's
conclusion has been the notion that judicial proceedings can be conducted with dignity and
integrity so as to shield the trial process itself from... irrelevant external factors, rather than
to aggravate them .... ").
80 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976).
81 Id.
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The Court reiterated the importance of a state's interest in Holbrook, when
it stated that the deployment of state troopers was justified because it was
"intimately related to the State's legitimate interest in maintaining custody
during the proceedings. 82 There is no essential state interest in allowing
spectators to wear expressive clothing that might justify allowing such
prejudicial materials into the courtroom. The probability of impermissible
communication, therefore, easily overshadows the non-existent state
concern.
3. The Presumption of Innocence
The presumption that every criminal defendant is innocent until proven
guilty is undermined when spectators display their opinions in front of the
jury. 83  In 1895, the Supreme Court unequivocally articulated the
importance of a presumption of innocence for the criminally accused: "The
principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."84 In doing so, the
Court made clear that every criminal defendant deserves to be presumed
innocent. 85 If trial spectators are allowed to make non-verbal statements to
the jury regarding the guilt of the defendant, they implicitly threaten this
presumption of innocence. A jury, after all, is composed of fallible people
who, despite their best efforts, may be swayed by a group of spectators
declaring the defendant's guilt.86 As the Supreme Court stated in Estelle,
"To implement the presumption [of innocence], courts must be alert to
factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. ' '87 This
danger of undercutting the presumption of innocence is particularly present
when large numbers of spectators are wearing expressive items.88
Again, opponents could argue that public displays of emotion are not
statements of the defendant's guilt. It seems unlikely, however, that family
members of victims, attending court in order to see justice fulfilled, would
use expressive items to make impartial statements. Indeed, it seems logical
that the family would only go to the effort of creating and wearing
expressive pieces in order to send a message of support for the victim. The
items are most likely worn to elicit sympathy, to show the innocence of the
82 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986).
83 Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990).
84 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
85 id.
86 See Feigenson, supra note 50, at 36-37.
87 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
88 See, e.g., People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (noting that thirty-
five spectators occupying one-half of the seats were wearing symbolic clothing).
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victim, and to impliedly implicate the defendant in any pain endured. If the
spectators truly believed the defendant was innocent, and therefore not
responsible for their grief, it is improbable that they would wear any
expressive clothing. The purpose for attending court in expressive clothing
day after day is to send a message.
Even if the message is purely one of sorrow, without any insinuation
of guilt, expressive items are still an impermissible communication in the
courtroom because they are irrelevant to the defendant's guilt.89 There is an
evidentiary purpose for only allowing family and friends to testify to the
intensity of their sorrow during the sentencing phase of a given trial: grief
produced by the crime is irrelevant to the culpability of the defendant. 90 If
spectators are allowed to create constant symbols of their grief-assuming
arguendo that the expressive items are only intended to implicate sorrow
and not guilt as well-irrelevant factors are introduced into the guilt phase
of the trial.9'
Proponents of allowing victims and their family members to wear
symbolic pieces also argue that assertions of the defendant's guilt by the
victims should not surprise the jury.92 A connected argument is that
expressions of guilt from the courtroom should not make the jury suddenly
believe a defendant is automatically guilty. These supporters claim that in
practice, juries can be given instructions by the judge to presume the
innocence of the defendant despite the atmosphere of the courtroom.
93
There are two key problems with this argument. First, when victims'
families assert guilt there is a possibility that they are in fact influencing the
jury.94 The jury may assume that people close to the victim are familiar
with the facts of the case and have drawn a reasonable conclusion of guilt.
95
The pressures of conformity might also influence the jury into thinking that
an entire courtroom of spectators cannot be wrong. Second, even if the
presiding judge gives clear instructions to the jury regarding the messages
sent from spectators, there is no guarantee that the jury will subconsciously
89 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561 (1965) (declaring that the presence of irrelevant
factors, such as television, does not contribute to the chief function of ascertaining the truth).
90 See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (limiting victim-impact
statements to the sentencing phase).
91 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 562 (discussing irrelevant external factors in the courtroom).
92 See Brief for Respondent at 29, Musladin v. Lamarque, 403 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 05-785), 2004 WL 1394298.
93 See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) ("A jury is presumed to follow its
instructions.").
94 See generally Feigenson, supra note 50.
95 See generally id.
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be able to disregard what they have already seen.96 As the Supreme Court
noted in 1968, "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury... all practicing attorneys know to be
unmitigated fiction., 97 The better solution is to avert the need for any
instruction, and eliminate the danger that the instruction will be
disregarded, by preventing the questionable conduct from occurring in the
first place.
4. The Sixth Amendment
If spectators are permitted to communicate through symbolic items in
the courtroom, the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants will be
violated.98  The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ensures that a
criminal defendant has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."99 The Sixth Amendment does not, however, guarantee any
rights to crime victims or to their families. Victims' wishful desires should
not override the clear constitutional rights of defendants.
The Confrontation Clause's "functional purpose" is to "promot[e]
reliability in criminal trial[s]" by "ensuring a defendant an opportunity for
cross-examination."' 00 This purpose is undermined when spectators are
allowed to make statements through the use of expressive items without
allowing the defendant to cross-examine the information. The symbolic
items can be interpreted as external testimony free of the force of cross-
examination.' 0 ' In Norris, the Ninth Circuit agreed that symbolic
accessories in the courtroom can violate the Confrontation Clause.,0 2 The
court held that the presence of spectators wearing buttons deprived the
defendant of a fair trial because the buttons "allow[ed] extraneous,
prejudicial considerations to permeate the proceedings without subjecting
them to the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination."'0 3
Spectators wearing expressive items are essentially allowed to "argue"
a point, through images or symbols, without having to endure cross-
examination. Instead, the jury is exposed to a viewpoint without hearing
96 See Lisa Eichhorn, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard
Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 346-47
(1989).
97 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) (citing Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
98 See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2.
100 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987).
'0' Norris, 918 F.2d at 833-34.




why it should not trust that opinion. The thrust of the Confrontation Clause
ensures that:
(1) ... the witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with the
seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty
for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth;" (3) permits the jury that is to decide
the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,
thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. 4
Statements made by spectators are inherently in tension with these
stated goals of the Confrontation Clause. First, the statements are not made
under oath. Rather, they are made by spectators who walked into the
courtroom without taking any oath to tell the truth. Admittedly, symbolic
ribbons and armbands contain no language to be interpreted as a "lie."
They can still, nevertheless, symbolically misrepresent the truth of the
situation.
Second, the expressive statements are not subject to any form of
inquiry. The jury has no tool to discover whether the statements are indeed
true. Again, this applies to any message the spectators might be trying to
send: guilt or sympathy. In fact, "though far more subtle than a direct
accusation, [a symbolic accessory's] message was all the more dangerous
precisely because it was not a formal accusation."10 5
Finally, without cross examination, the jury has no way of telling
whether the spectators are credible. Especially in the case of victims'
families, there might be powerful motives of bias to lead the jurors to a
certain verdict. This bias may not be fully revealed without cross-
examination. Thus the jury is left to evaluate and assess the spectators'
credibility without the aid of cross-examination. In effect, the symbolic
accusation from the gallery stands "unchallenged, lending credibility and
weight to the state's case without being subject to the constitutional
protections to which such evidence is ordinarily subjected."10 6
The trial system uses an oath, cross-examination, and physical
presence to ensure that evidence admitted against a defendant is reliable and
trustworthy, thereby serving the purpose of the Confrontation Clause.
10 7
When a defendant's right to confront evidence presented to the jury (in this
case visual statements from spectators) is violated, there is no guarantee that
evidence submitted to the jury is reliable or relevant. The Norris court
104 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
'05 Norris, 918 F.2d at 833.
106 Id. at 833.
107 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
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agreed that symbolic displays of emotion "constituted a statement, not
subject to cross-examination."'' 0 8
In addition, all statements made during a criminal trial should come
from the practitioners' side of the bar.'09 Under that logical reasoning, no
evidence should be presented from the gallery. Spectators should not be
allowed to add arguments, in any form, because (1) they are not subject to
cross-examination, and (2) they are not presented through the regular means
of witness testimony. When spectators are permitted to express opinions
and sentiments, the Sixth Amendment rights of the criminally accused are
violated.
5. Due Process
Due process also requires that expressive items be banned from
courtrooms. The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial trial is applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 10 Together, these explicit
Constitutional liberties afford every criminal defendant the right to a fair
trial.'11 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court determined: "Due
process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free
from outside influences. ' 12 Once established, the Court has repeatedly
affirmed a defendant's right to a fair trial. As early as 1927, the Court
explained how a defendant could easily be deprived of due process:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused
denies the latter due process of law. 113
The Supreme Court considers it a denial of due process if the
factfinder has even a mere temptation to render a verdict based on
something other than the evidence presented. 14 Applied to the issue of
symbolic displays of emotion, there is a strong argument that expressive
items could, at the very least, tempt a fact finder to reach a conclusion
without considering the burden of proof or the evidence at hand. Symbolic
108 Norris, 878 F.2d at 1183.
109 See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) ("In the constitutional sense,
trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the 'evidence
developed' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom
where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-
examination, and of counsel.").
110 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1968).
U.S. CONST. amend VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
112 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).




accessories may inflame the compassion of the jury and coax them into
making a decision based on something other than the merits of the case.
The danger that outside influences may affect the jury strikes at the
heart of due process. 15 When criminal defendants are not protected from
prejudicial influences, they are inevitably denied due process: "[C]ourts
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for
defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming
under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function.""
6
Lower federal courts have specifically addressed the threat to due
process posed by influences within the courtroom.117 In United States v.
Yahweh, the district court explained that "[t]his court has an obligation to
ensure that the trial is a fair process and most certainly has an obligation to
protect jurors from any possibility of influence . .,118 The court held that
the criminal defendant's associates violated due process by dressing in a
uniform of white turbans and white robes to court every day of the trial." 9
The district judge agreed with the reasoning employed by the Ninth Circuit
in Norris: "[T]o sanction this sort of extrajudicial participation by trial
attendees is not only antithetical to notions of due process but also risks
converting the 'courtroom proceedings [into] little more than a hollow
formality. '"5120
Given this judicial responsibility to protect criminal defendants from
outside influences, judges should take proactive steps to prevent any
external impediments on criminal trials. 121 Not only are judges granted the
power and authority to remove symbolic items from the courtroom, they are
required to do so in order to protect the defendant's fundamental right to
due process. 122 Unless criminal defendants are tried in atmospheres free of
avoidable outside influences, their due process rights will be jeopardized.
And until expressive and symbolic clothing is removed, criminal
courtrooms will not be truly free of outside influences.
"' Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63.
116 Id.
117 United States v. Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
118 Id. at 1344.
"9 Id. at 1343.
120 Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466,473 (1965)).
121 48A C.J.S. Judges § 148 (2004) ("[A] judge must assist in the search for truth, and it
is the function of the judge to see that justice is accomplished.").
122 Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. at 1343.
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B. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN OUTRIGHT BAN
1. Victim's Rights
Some argue that victims have a special place in the courtroom, and as a
result victims' families should be able to visibly represent and remember
the victim. 123 The idea is that if courts were genuinely sensitive to the
needs of crime victims, they would willingly allow families to wear
sentimental symbols during courtroom proceedings.1 24  While this
viewpoint is not without merit, it extends the rights of victims too far.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a "right of access to criminal trials
in particular is properly afforded protection by the First Amendment."' ' 25
The Court highlighted the importance of allowing access to criminal trials
because it "permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the
judicial process ....,126
In addition to the right of access, the Supreme Court has also discussed
the involvement of crime victims in the criminal process. 12  Justice
Blackmun has opined that "the family of the victim, [and] those who have
suffered similarly ... have an interest in observing the course of a
prosecution." 128 In Payne v. Tennessee, Justices Souter and Kennedy
described the importance of victim's family and friends within the judicial
process:
[Jiust as defendants appreciate the web of relationships and dependencies in which
they live, they know that their victims are not human islands, but individuals with
parents or children, spouses or friends or dependents. Thus, when a defendant
chooses to kill, or to raise the risk of a victim's death, this choice necessarily relates to
a whole human being and threatens an association of others, who may be distinctly
hurt. 1
29
These Supreme Court decisions reflect the importance for victims'
associates to be able to participate in the judicial process, especially when
they are indirectly or directly affected by the crime at issue.
123 See generally Brief for National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006) (No. 05-785), 2006 WL
1746420.
124 People v. Chatman, 133 P.3d 534, 550 (Cal. 2006).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 606.
127 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (2006) (addressing the right of a victim's
friends and family members to participate in and be recognized during the sentencing phase
of criminal trials).
128 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
129 Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Although victims have a special place in the courtroom, their
entitlements are not unlimited. While the Supreme Court recognizes that
victims have a right to attend trial, it has not granted victims the right to do
whatever they want once inside the courtroom. 130  The decorum of the
courtroom should reflect respect for the judicial process, and judges have a
right to prohibit spectators from doing anything that might undermine that
atmosphere.1
31
Lower courts have recognized the need to balance the right of public
access with the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 132  For
instance, in State v. Franklin, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia determined that a group of spectators wearing Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD) badges in the courtroom impermissibly affected
the judicial process. 133 The court stated that "[a]n important element [in
balancing public access to trials with the right to a fair trial] is insuring that
the jury is always insulated, at least to the best of the court's ability, from
every source of pressure or prejudice.' 34
There are already restrictions on what spectators may wear to court.' 
35
The rights of victims to attend trial and participate in the judicial process
will not be infringed if they are prohibited from wearing certain clothes.
136
The spirit behind the right of access to the trial is that victims, and more
generally, all those affected by the crime, should be "at the center of the
criminal justice process, not on the outside looking in." 131 Crime victims
and their families are no less in the center of the criminal process when they
are prohibited from wearing expressive clothing. Indeed, they are more
likely to see a just prosecution of the offender if they attend trial without
symbols of emotion. 138 They will still be able to hear the arguments; they
130 See Zitter, supra note 13.
131 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 277 (1821) ("Courts of justice are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect,
and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates .....
132 State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 455 (W. Va. 1985).
133 Id.
134 id.
135 For one example of restrictions that a state has imposed, see MINN. SUPREME COURT,
VISITOR'S GUIDE TO ORAL ARGUMENTS, at 2, available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents//Public/Court-Infonrmation-Office/SC-_Guide_to Ora
lArguments6.08(legal).pdf ("Remove hats before entering the courtroom.").
136 Id.
"' William J. Clinton, Proclamation on Crime Victims Rights Week (released Apr. 15,
1997), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim2889/is-n16v33/ai 19601959.
138 Sharon Blanchard Hawk, State v. Mann: Extraneous Prejudicial Information in the
Jury Room: Beautiful Minds Allowed, 34 N.M. L. REV. 149, 155 (2004) ("External
influences on the jury may be grounds for impeachment of a verdict when the improper
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will still be able to observe the witness's expressions; they will still be able
to see that justice is served.
2. Other Public Displays of Emotion
The National Crime Victim Law Institute argues that because displays
of emotion, such as tears and visible reactions, naturally occur in the
courtroom, expressive clothing would not add an emotional element to the
criminal trial. 39  Further, proponents contend that juries should not be
surprised in highly emotional trials when victims are themselves highly
emotional.140 Since the jury already knows that family and friends want to
support the victim, symbolic accessories will not give the jury any new
information.
This argument is well-grounded but limited. It is true that during
highly emotional trials, spectators close to the victim may cry, sigh, gasp, or
weep.14' As the Supreme Court of California has noted, "Courts cannot
expect that families will always conform their behavior to the standards of
trained professionals."' 142 The victim's family and friends may noticeably
react to testimony or information in a way that makes it clear to the entire
courtroom that they are upset. While these reactions may potentially
influence the jury, they are unavoidable in a system that protects access to
the courtroom. Even if the spectators are completely composed and silent
throughout the entire trial, the jury might notice their mere presence.
Family members and friends tend to sit together in the courtroom and it
would not be hard for the jury to figure out who they were.
A spectator's unavoidable physical showing of emotion should not be
equated with a spectator's privilege to capture that emotion in a piece of
expressive clothing. Emotional reactions may be inevitable and
unpredictable, and the court must accept the imperfections of the system. 1
43
But the use of symbolic clothing is premeditated and communicative, while
sighs and tears are involuntary and unplanned. Unlike tears, symbolic
displays are not natural reactions to mourning. While courts cannot control
when or how a spectator may react to the given events in a trial, they do
have the ability to prevent other types of public displays of emotion. The
court can, therefore, prevent the manifestation of emotions through
influence is material to the verdict and the jury's consideration of the improper evidence
deprives a party of a just result.").
139 See Brief for New Jersey Crime Victim's Law Center, supra note 44, at 9.
140 Id. at 9 (citing People v. Chatman, 38 Cal. 4th 344 (Cal. 2006)).
141 See Hallman v. United States, 410 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1979).
142 People v. Chatman, 133 P.3d 534, 551 (Cal. 2006).
143 See State v. Jones, 479 S.E.2d 517, 521 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that removal of
crying spectators was a proper exercise of judicial discretion).
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symbols, and in doing so limit the amount of influential emotion in a given
courtroom.
3. The First Amendment
A third argument against a ban on symbolic items is that the First
Amendment's right to free speech guarantees spectators the right to
communicate their views. 144  The First Amendment unquestionably
provides that a criminal trial will be open to the public. 145 However, the
Court has carefully limited its recognition of the First Amendment rights of
trial spectators:
Our holding today does not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public and
representatives of the press are absolute. Just as a government may impose reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such
objectives as the free flow of traffic ... so may a trial judgef in the interest of the fair
administration ofjustice, impose reasonable limitations ....
Victims' families have the constitutional right to attend trial, gather
information, hear evidence, and see witnesses. 147  They do not have the
right to communicate, implicitly or explicitly, with the jury. The right to
access the courtroom is distinguishable from the right to communicate with
the decision-makers.
48
Further, there are important justifications for public access to trials:
[T]he requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of
interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility
and to the importance of their functions. 
14 9
No comparable legal interest justifies irrelevant spectator involvement
in a trial. Spectator communication with the jury is not for the benefit of
144 See Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 658 (2006) (Souter, J., concurring) (Justice
Souter suggested that First Amendment rights might apply, but chose not to "decide whether
protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by [the] spectators'
buttons" at issue in the case).
145 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) ("Absent an
overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public.").
146 Id. at 593 n.18.
141 Id. at 576.
148 See Christopher R. Goddu, Comment, Victim's "Rights" or a Fair Trial Wronged?,
41 BUFF. L. REv. 245, 261-62 (1993).
149 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948) (citation omitted); see also People v.
Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614-15 (Sup. Ct. 1990) ("This court rejects any premise that
people who want to communicate protests, views or feelings of any kind or nature, for or
against any person, issue or cause, have a constitutional right to do so within the confines of
a public courtroom.").
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the accused. The right of the defendant to a fair trial outweighs the First
Amendment rights of spectators.' 50 The right to free speech is not absolute,
especially when other constitutional interests are at stake.15' Quite simply,
a courtroom is not the space for demonstration. The rights contained in the
First Amendment "must bow to the constitutional right to a fair trial" when
there is a threat of an unfair trial.
52
Finally, the courtroom is a unique forum; it cannot be as open to free
speech and irreverent behavior as are other venues, such as city streets.
153
A New York court captured this idea in People v. Pennisi:
There are some public places, such as a courtroom, which are so clearly committed
to special and defined purposes that their use for the airing of general grievances
would be clearly out of order, i.e., the communication of feelings or concerns about
any person, issue or cause involved or otherwise would be entirely out of place. 1
54
Pennisi arose when approximately thirty-five family members and
friends of a murder victim wore red and black ribbon corsages in the
courtroom. 55 The prosecutors argued that the ribbons were merely symbols
of "concern and solidarity for the victim's family," but the court held they
were disruptive and inappropriate for a courtroom.
156
Further, the court has the power and the responsibility to "preserve and
enforce order in its immediate presence, to prevent interruption,
disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings, and to control all persons
connected with a judicial proceeding before it. A large measure of
discretion resides in the trial court in this respect .... ,,157 Thus, a court can
restrict spectator conduct, even if such limitation also curtails free speech
rights. As the Supreme Court has stated, "In securing freedom of speech,
the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or
juries. That is no more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an
exercise of the right to vote."'
5 8
Consequently, while spectators have a First Amendment right to attend
trial, there is no First Amendment right to influence the trial process. As
150 Gannet v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979) (affirming the trial judge's
conclusion that the public's constitutional right of access to the court was outweighed by the
defendant's fight to a fair trial).
151 Id. (examining the competing societal interests involved).
152 Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Levine v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
764 F.2d 590, 597-98 (9th Cir. 1985).




157 75 AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 189 (2007).
158 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens recently wrote, "[T]here is no merit whatsoever to the
suggestion that the First Amendment may provide some measure of
protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in actual or symbolic
speech to express any point of view about an ongoing proceeding."
159
Furthermore, if the defendant is convicted, family and friends can
express their opinions, sentiments, and sorrows during the sentencing phase
of the trial. 160 In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court explicitly granted
courts permission to consider victim impact evidence in determining
appropriate sentences.16 1 The Court expressed that the "assessment of harm
caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has understandably
been an important concern of the criminal law.' ' 162  Taking that into
consideration, the speech of spectators is only limited for a portion of the
trial. They are still afforded the opportunity to articulate their pain during
the sentencing portion of the case. 163 Indeed, at that point they are able to
clearly vocalize the precise sentiment they can only hope to send through
expressive items.
4. Practical Concerns
Finally, advocates for expressive clothing could point to the expense
and impracticality of regulating spectators' clothing as an argument for
allowing it in courtrooms. The logistics of banning all expressive clothing
from courtrooms, however, are actually quite simple. Court marshals are
responsible for maintaining decorum in the courtroom. 164 As part of that
duty, they currently may ask spectators to remove hats, sunglasses, and
inappropriate clothing, as is done at the United States Supreme Court.165 It
would be a simple, inexpensive move to add symbolic items to that list.
The government would not need to hire any additional employees and the
new restriction would not add any noticeable demand on the current court
marshals.
Banning expressive items from all courtrooms may in fact advance,
rather than hinder, state interests. A general ban would prevent expensive
159 Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 656 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring).
160 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 819.
163 Id.
164 91 C.J.S. United States Marshals § 16 (2006) ("It is the duty of the marshal and his
deputies to guard against any outside influences which might pervade the minds of the jury
in arriving at a just verdict.").
165 See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., VISITOR'S GUIDE TO ORAL ARGUMENT AT THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov
/visiting/visitorsguidetooralargument.pdf [hereinafter VISITOR'S GUIDE].
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and timely appeals that might arise if symbolic pieces of clothing are
permitted in courtrooms on a case by case, or judge by judge basis. The
rule would promote efficiency in the legal system by preventing
unnecessary appeals. Further, a universal ban would leave no doubt as to
what items might be permissible and what pieces of attire are considered
prejudicial. As the court in Norris held, "[W]hile the risk of prejudice
[created by expressive buttons] was profound, the burden of alleviating that
risk was minimal." 166 The practical burden of preventing symbolic and
expressive clothing is extremely low and is substantially overshadowed by
the potentially grave consequence of an unfair trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right of the criminally accused to receive a fair trial is a bedrock
principle of American justice. It is explicitly guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and entrenched in the adversary system. Courts continually
strive to ensure that every verdict is based exclusively on the evidence and
arguments presented, and not on external factors. It naturally follows, then,
that courts should endeavor to eliminate external factors that could
influence the outcome of a case. An outright ban on symbolic expressions
of emotions by trial spectators would significantly further this objective.
Although this absolute prohibition restricts the free speech of trial
spectators, it does so in a very limited capacity. Victims are still free to
express their emotions publicly through other avenues. They should not,
however, be allowed to undermine a trial process that demands complete
fairness. The courtroom is a distinct venue that depends on a unique set of
rules in order to function properly. Indeed, "Few places are a more real
expression of the constitutional authority of the government than a
courtroom, where the law itself unfolds. Within the courtroom, the
government invokes its laws to determine the rights of those who stand
before it."' 167 If spectators are allowed to bring their emotional viewpoints
to the table through symbolic means, it will deteriorate the sanctity of the
courtroom.
The Supreme Court has implicitly agreed that symbolic expressions do
not belong in the courtroom. 168  When the Supreme Court hears oral
arguments it allows spectators to listen, but it expressly prohibits them from
wearing symbolic clothing. 69 In fact, the Visitor's Guide to Oral Argument
at the Supreme Court of the United States unambiguously states that
166 Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990).
167 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).




"display buttons and inappropriate clothing may not be worn." 170  In
banning such items, the Supreme Court acknowledges that they add an
unnecessary element to proceedings.
In light of the high probability that jurors will be psychologically
influenced by the emotional statements of spectators, the judicial system
needs to be particularly wary of anything that might send an emotional
message. Even if symbolic items are not intended to put blame on the
criminal defendant, they still may influence the jury. As the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers states:
There is no conceivable version of a just and fair trial that includes the regular,
deliberate intrusion of such outside influences into the trial process. Such factors are
at once highly prejudicial to the disfavored party and utterly irrelevant to the trial's
truthseeking function.
71
Indeed, it is precisely these grief-filled messages that pull at the
heartstrings of jurors. Due to the psychological susceptibility of juries,
public displays of emotion are inherently prejudicial. They endanger the
accused's right to a fair trial by tainting the minds of the jury. Ultimately,
since the risk of an unfair trial increases with the presence of emotionally-
charged expressions by trial spectators, such displays should be prohibited
in the interest of fair administration. Whenever the integrity of a trial is
endangered, the rights of the criminal defendant are also in jeopardy. The
legal system has a responsibility to keep the trial process as uncontaminated
as possible. Public policy requires, and the Constitution demands, that
expressive symbols are proscribed in criminal trials. The Supreme Court
should therefore enact a prophylactic rule prohibiting all symbolic displays
of emotion in courtrooms.
To return to the words of the Supreme Court, "The Sixth Amendment
stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it
provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' '1 72  As long as trial
spectators are allowed to express their emotions through symbolic means,
justice will not and can not be done.
170 Id.
171 Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 3, Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006) (No. 05-785), 2006
WL 2430574.
172 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
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